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THE LAW PROFESSOR AS
ADVOCATE
Jonathan L. Entin*
THE DEVELOPMENT OF the academic law school in theUnited States coincided with the rise of the modem research uni-
versity.' Culminating a process that began shortly after the Civil
War, virtually all accredited law schools now are part of universi-
ties, and law students typically have acquired baccalaureate degrees
before embarking upon their professional studies.2 Indeed, law
schools have become so integral to their parent institutions that law
professors hold important administrative positions on many
campuses.3
Yet legal education differs significantly from graduate educa-
tion. At the most basic level, law schools train students who will
work in "the real world," whereas graduate schools prepare the
next generation of scholars for positions in the academy.4 This es-
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. The author thanks
Erik Jensen, Melvyn Durchslag, Peter Joy, Robert Gordon, Steven Lubet, Ian Ayres, Robert
Lawry, Thomas Geraghty, and Ronald Coffey for helping him to think more clearly about
some of the issues discussed in this essay.
1. The crucial event in the rise of academic legal training was the appointment of
Christopher Columbus Langdell as dean of Harvard Law School in 1870. The selection of
Charles Eliot as president of Harvard University in 1869 and the founding of The Johns
Hopkins University in 1876 were among the most significant episodes in the growth of re-
search-oriented institutions of higher education. For comprehensive accounts, see R. STE-
VENS, LAW SCHOOL (1983); L. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
(1965). See also J. BEN-DAVID, THE SCIENTIST'S ROLE IN SOCIETY 139-59 (1971); C.
JENCKS & D. RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 12-20, 155-98 (Anchor ed. 1969).
2. The number of proprietary law schools unaffiliated with universities declined sub-
stantially in the years following World War II. The past decade, however, has seen an in-
crease in the number of unaccredited and often independent law schools. R. STEVENS, supra
note 1, at 207-09, 243-44. For at least the past quarter-century, the typical entering law
student has been a college graduate. Id. at 209; Thorne, Professional Education in Law, in E.
HUGHES, B. THORNE, A. DEBAGGIS, A. GURIN & D. WILLIAMS, EDUCATION FOR THE
PROFESSIONS OF MEDICINE, LAW, THEOLOGY, AND SOCIAL WELFARE 101, 109 (1973).
3. For example, the presidents of several of the nation's oldest and most distinguished
universities, including Derek Bok of Harvard, Benno Schmidt of Yale, and Michael Sovern of
Columbia, are former law professors.
4. Two qualifications are necessary at this point. First, not all persons who receive
graduate degrees in the arts and sciences work in academic settings. In some fields, such as
chemistry and physics, an appreciable proportion traditionally have found full-time employ-
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sential difference influences the organization of both legal and grad-
uate education. Law school courses typically have relatively large
enrollments and are conducted more or less in the Socratic manner,
while most graduate courses have far fewer students and operate as
seminars. Law students rarely enjoy the close working relationships
with their professors that many graduate students do. And law
school writing requirements have never approached the magnitude
of graduate school dissertation standards.
Despite these differences, important similarities also exist be-
tween the two types of education. For example, the criteria for ap-
pointment of law professors emphasize academic factors, and the
standards for promotion increasingly stress scholarly publication.
In these respects, law faculties apply selection and retention princi-
ples similar to those governing elsewhere on campus.
The emphasis on scholarship implies that university faculty do
and should work in a relatively cloistered environment. Several fac-
tors, however, inexorably have pushed the academy toward greater
engagement with the external world. Every state and many munici-
palities operate universities, and the federal government has become
increasingly important as a source of support for research in both
public and private institutions. This substantial public investment
in higher education has led the nation to turn to universities for
solutions to a vast array of social problems ranging from the devel-
opment of sophisticated military technology to the improvement of
life in deteriorating central cities.' These developments have trans-
formed what had been a relatively isolated institution into a com-
plex service center, leading to a distinctive American university that
is "neither entirely of the world nor entirely apart from it."6
The transformation of the university necessarily has affected
ment outside universities. See D. MACRAE, JR., THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
246 n.20 (1976). By contrast, only a small minority of graduates of even the so-called "pro-
ducer law schools" ever become law professors. See Wellington, Challenge to Legal Educa-
tion: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 327, 329 (1987).
Second, one should not exaggerate the significance of the differential career choices of law
students and graduate students. To be sure, law professors, unlike graduate school profes-
sors, do not train their students to follow them into the academy. At the same time, graduate
school professors do not train their students as clones. Many arts and sciences scholars have
learned their craft in graduate school and have gone on to extend or to criticize the work of
their teachers.
5. The seminal discussion of these developments appears in C. KERR, THE USES OF
THE UNIVERSITY 46-75, 86-94, 114-18 (1963). For other perspectives, see, e.g., J. BARZUN,
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 10-11, 21-29, 151-52, 159-60 (1968); D. BOK, BEYOND THE
IVORY TOWER 61-65, 301-02 (1982).
6. C. KERR, supra note 5, at 2.
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members of the faculty. As professors have conducted research on
subjects of concern to the community beyond the campus, they
have found themselves drawn into discussions relating to public af-
fairs. Occasionally scholars have felt moved to speak out of per-
sonal conviction; sometimes their views have been solicited by one
or another party to the debate. The frequency of professorial in-
volvement may have increased when faculty members discovered
that their academic expertise leads others to accord disproportion-
ate weight to their opinions on issues of public policy.7
Because the law occupies a uniquely powerful niche in the na-
tion's social and political structure, law professors have enjoyed un-
usual access to the fora in which civic debate occurs. Thomas
Emerson's career exemplifies the public role of the legal scholar.
His writings include frequently cited standard works on the first
amendment8 and civil rights.9 Beyond that, however, he has partic-
ipated as a lawyer in several landmark constitutional cases. This
symposium provides a fitting opportunity to reflect upon his re-
markable career.
This essay reflects upon that career and considers some larger
intellectual issues about the vocation of law teaching. Part I re-
views three of Professor Emerson's cases which had an important
impact on the law. Part II compares his participation in those cases
with analogous public activities of contemporary law teachers. Fi-
nally, Part III tentatively explores the connection between the aca-
demic and the public roles of law professors. l Drawing upon
7. See Wood, Scientists and Politics: The Rise of an Apolitical Elite, in SCIENTISTS AND
NATIONAL POLICY-MAKING 41, 52-69 (R. Gilpin & C. Wright eds. 1964).
8. E.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Emerson,
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
9. E.g., 1 & 2 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE & S. LAW, EMERSON, HABER,
AND DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1976);
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
10. Because Professor Emerson has not held elective or appointive office since entering
the academy, this essay will not directly consider issues specific to office-holding. A surpris-
ingly large number of academics have gone into government. The most prominent example
was Woodrow Wilson, a leading political scientist who became governor of New Jersey
before serving two terms as President. Other academic specialists in the arts and sciences
who have been elected to public office include Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, another
political scientist, former Wisconsin Governor Lee Dreyfus, a speech professor, and former
Senator Paul Douglas, an economist. (Douglas eventually lost his seat to Charles Percy, who
had been one of his students.) Law professors who have won election to high office include
former Senators J.W. Fulbright and Wayne Morse, former Representative Robert Drinan,
and former Colorado Governor Richard Lamm. Several law professors, including Shirley
Abrahamson and Hans Linde, have been elected to state supreme courts.
Other scholars have been appointed to important governmental positions. Prominent re-
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commentary from other disciplines, it suggests that faculty involve-
ment in the external world can have costs as well as benefits for the
academy. This portion of the essay is not intended in any sense as
criticism of Professor Emerson. Rather, it is designed to suggest
questions for contemplation by those of us who follow him.
I
In Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court invalidated a
state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. In Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,2 the Court overturned a conviction for contempt aris-
ing from a university lecturer's refusal to cooperate with a state leg-
islative investigation of subversive influences. And in Sweatt v.
Painter,3 the Court effectively rejected state-mandated racial segre-
gation in legal education. Professor Emerson represented the pre-
vailing parties in Griswold and Sweezy, and he was one of the
principal authors of an influential amicus curiae brief in Sweatt.
A
Of the three cases, Griswold is by far the most widely known.
At issue there were the convictions of the executive director and the
medical director of a Planned Parenthood affiliate for providing
contraceptive advice and assistance to married couples in violation
of a ninteenth-century state law. 4 After finding that the Planned
Parenthood officials had standing to raise the rights of their married
patients, 5 the Court held that the law violated the right of privacy
cent examples include economists George Schultz and Alfred Kahn, and political scientists
McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Many law professors have
been appointed to the bench, perhaps most notably Felix Frankfurter, Antonin Scalia, and
Roger Traynor. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been chaired by
such leading scholars as William Cary and David Ruder, and five of the past seven Solicitors
General (Archibald Cox, Erwin Griswold, Robert Bork, Rex Lee, and Charles Fried) have
been law professors.
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
13. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
14. The Griswold litigation initially was handled by Fowler Harper, Professor Emerson's
colleague at Yale Law School. Harper organized a series of legal challenges to the Connecti-
cut statute after two of his students expressed an interest in having the birth control ban
overturned. A divided Supreme Court rejected the first case on justiciability grounds. Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Harper continued the legal battle in Griswold, in which he
wrote the jurisdictional statement and the reply to the state's motion to dismiss before he
died. Professor Emerson then took over the case, writing the brief on the merits and present-
ing the oral argument. See Emerson, Fowler Vincent Harper, 74 YALE L.J. 601, 602-03
(1965).
15. 381 U.S. at 481.
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implicit in the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.' 6
Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court has become celebrated
(or notorious, depending upon one's point of view) for its reliance
upon "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. That word never appeared
in Professor Emerson's submissions. Indeed, the privacy argument
had a distinctly secondary place in the brief. 7 Instead, Emerson
emphasized that the state law denied married couples liberty and
property without due process of law in contravention of the four-
teenth amendment. This arbitrary statute, he maintained, lacked a
reasonable connection to a proper legislative purpose and thus
could not stand. 8
The Griswold decision has had an enormous impact. That rul-
ing provided the basis for a series of later cases upholding a broad
right of access to contraceptives. 19 More recently, Griswold was the
principal precedent upon which the Court relied in finding an ex-
pansive constitutional right to abortion.2" At the same time, the
Court has made clear that Griswold does not protect an unlimited
right of sexual privacy.2' Although the decision remains controver-
sial, largely due to its foundational importance to the jurisprudence
of abortion, 2 the centrality of this case in the debate over the nomi-
nations of Judges Bork and Kennedy to the Supreme Court suggests
that the precedent remains secure at least for the foreseeable
16. Id. at 484-86.
Several separate opinions reached the same conclusion on somewhat different grounds.
Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, emphasized the in-
dependent signficance of the ninth amendment. Id. at 487-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justices Harlan and White viewed the case in substantive due process terms. Id. at 499-500
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
17. Brief for Appellants at 79-89.
18. Id. at 21-78. This argument has obvious overtones of the substantive due process
doctrine which long had been anathema to persons of Professor Emerson's liberal views.
Indeed, the brief recognizes this fact and seeks to limit the argument to situations involving
personal rather than economic rights. See id. at 21-23. The difficulty of drawing the distinc-
tion between these categories of rights prompted the majority of the Court to rest its decision
upon the privacy rationale. See 381 U.S. at 481-82.
19. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129, 152-56, 159 (1973).
21. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (upholding state law against sodomy as
applied to homosexual conduct in a private residence).
22. Some of the opposition to Griswold is unrelated to the abortion debate. For general
criticism of the ruling as "unprincipled," see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7-11 (1971). See also Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388,
1391-98 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
For criticism of Griswold from an explicitly prolife viewpoint, see Myers, The End of
Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. - (1988).
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B
The Sweezy case is much less familiar than Griswold, but the
decision helped to limit legislative investigations of unpopular per-
sons and ideas. The protagonist of this drama was Paul Sweezy, a
prominent socialist and one-time Harvard economics professor who
took up a career as a free-lance writer and lecturer after serving
with the Office of Strategic Services during World War 1.24 From
1952 to 1954, he spoke by faculty invitation to humanities classes at
the University of New Hampshire. Eventually, his activities at-
tracted the attention of the state legislature, which directed the at-
torney general on its behalf to investigate subversive persons and
activities under a previously enacted statute.
Operating in effect as a single-member legislative committee, 2
5
the attorney general questioned Sweezy at length on two separate
occasions. Sweezy responded to most inquiries but refused to dis-
cuss his guest lectures at the university, his participation and as-
sociations in the Progressive Party, or his views on Communism.26
When he persisted in his refusal, the state courts held him in
contempt.
23. Some commentators have suggested that the laws at issue in both the contraception
and the abortion cases might more comfortably have been viewed as imposing special burdens
on women in violation of the equal protection clause. See, eg., Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. REV. 375 (1985); Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57-59 (1977); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 1007-28 (1984). Whatever the merits of these suggestions, the Griswold Court
probably would not have accepted a sex-discrimination argument. See Ginsburg, The Burger
Court's Grapplings with Sex Discrimination, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 132, 132 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
24. Sweezy has written several books which retain their appeal among more radical in-
tellectuals. E.g., P. BARAN & P. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1964); P. SWEEZY, SO-
CIALISM (1949); P. SWEEZY, THE THEORY OP CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT (1942). He also
founded and continues to edit The Monthly Review, an independent socialist journal. For
further biographical information on Sweezy, see R. JACOBY, THE LAST INTELLECTUALS
177-78 (1987).
25. The legislature's delegation of its investigative authority to the attorney general,
which might have raised serious separation-of-powers concerns had the case involved the
federal government rather than a state, played no part in the Court's decision. Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (plurality opinion); id. at 256-57 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result).
26. Sweezy declined to discuss the Progressive Party because it was an entirely legal
organization. Its presidential candidate, Henry Wallace, received over a million votes in the
1948 election. See id. at 240 n.6, 242 n.7. Sweezy did testify that he had never belonged to
the Communist Party. Id. at 244.
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A fragmented Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Warren's
plurality opinion reasoned that the record did not afford adequate
assurance that the legislature had asked the attorney general to
gather the type of facts encompassed within the questions that
Sweezy had declined to answer.217 Justice Frankfurter, in a concur-
rence joined by Justice Harlan, took a quite different tack. Explic-
itly balancing the competing considerations, he concluded that the
state's interest in protecting against "the remote, shadowy threat to
[its] security"28 could not support the substantial threat which the
disputed questions posed for Sweezy's interest in intellectual and
political autonomy. 9
The Court's inability to agree upon a rationale makes the teach-
ing of the case "obscure." 3 When viewed in historical context,
however, the result was significant. The legislative investigation oc-
curred, and the authorizing statutes were passed, at the height of
the McCarthy era.31 During this period, the Court had upheld a
variety of federal and state antisubversion measures. 32 The Sweezy
decision departed strikingly from this pattern. While neither the
first nor the only ruling to this effect, it did help to suggest the exist-
ence of legal limits upon loyalty and security programs.33
One aspect of this case merits special attention. Many of the
questions that Sweezy refused to answer concerned the content of
his lectures at the University of New Hampshire. Professor Emer-
son from the beginning emphasized the special threat that such in-
quiries posed for academic freedom, which he characterized as "one
of [the] most significant and sensitive" elements of first amendment
concern.34 He devoted considerable attention to a broad claim that
27. Id. at 253-55 (plurality opinion).
28. Id. at 265 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
29. Id. at 266-67.
30. Sutherland, The Supreme Court, 1956 Term-Foreword: The Citizen's Immunities
and Public Opinion, 71 HARV. L. REV. 85, 91 (1957).
31. For a contemporaneous account of the national atmosphere at the time, see R.
ROVERE, SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY 3-74 (1959). For a sophisticated analysis of public and
elite opinion during this period, see S. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1955).
32. E.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (per curiam).
33. See also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
34. Jurisdictional Statement at 18; Brief for Appellant at 27. See also id. at 28-29 & n.1 I
(collecting authorities assessing the deleterious impact of legislative investigations upon aca-
demic freedom).
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the state lacked any power to examine the content of classroom
discussion.3"
Professor Emerson's academic freedom argument did not prove
dispositive, but it was recognized. The plurality opinion, while rest-
ing its conclusion on other grounds, contains a paragraph re-
marking upon the "self-evident" importance of free inquiry in
American universities.36 Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand,
devoted several pages to the argument.37 He feared that political
scrutiny of academic discussion would cause "grave harm" to
higher education. Accordingly, he would require a substantial justi-
fication for inquiry into the content of classroom lectures. Because
the state had only the most meager evidence that Sweezy believed in
the violent overthrow of the existing order, the attorney general
could not legitimately ask what he had told the University of New
Hampshire humanities students.
Of course, dicta in a plurality opinion and extended discussion
in a concurrence do not make legal doctrine. So far, at least, the
full Court has not explicitly accorded first amendment protection to
academic freedom. Nevertheless, the concept seems to underlie a
number of decisions relating to educational issues.38
C
The Sweatt case was part of a trilogy of decisions that played an
important part in the development of modern equal protection doc-
trine.39 Sweatt effectively required the desegregation of American
legal education. The companion cases invalidated a series of prac-
tices designed to segregate a black graduate student within a previ-
ously all-white state university4' and a railroad's rule requiring
segregated seating in dining cars.4
The litigation in Sweatt was part of the NAACP's extensive
campaign against educational segregation that culminated in Brown
35. Brief for Appellant at 32-41.
36. 354 U.S. at 250.
37. Id. at 261-64 (Frankfurter, L, concurring in the result).
38. See, eg., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578-79 & n.6 (1987); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107
(1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 487 (1960).
39. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). For a more detailed examination of Sweatt
and its companion cases, see Entin, Sweatt v. Painter, the End of Segregation, and the Trans-
formation of Education Law, 5 REv. LITIGATION 3 (1986).
40. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
41. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
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v. Board of Education.42 Heman M. Sweatt, a black postal worker,
was denied admission to the University of Texas law school solely
because of his race. The state instead offered him a place in a newly
created law school for blacks.43 The state maintained that the rule
of Plessy v. Ferguson' allowed the provision of separate but equal
educational facilities and that the black law school was substantially
equal to the all-white school at Texas.
Thurgood Marshall, chief counsel for Sweatt, vigorously at-
tacked the state's claim of equality. At trial he presented extensive
expert testimony detailing the wide differences between the two law
schools.45 The experts focused not only upon the obvious contrasts
in physical facilities, but also upon the subtle effects of differences in
class size, student background and experience, and extracurricular
activities.46 Not surprisingly, the state courts rejected Sweatt's
claim.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the NAACP was
supported by an extraordinary amicus curiae brief. Professor Emer-
son was one of the principal authors of that brief, which was sub-
mitted by an ad hoc group known as the Committee of Law
Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education and signed by
nearly 200 law professors.4 7 That brief has become celebrated for
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); M.
TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-
1950 (1987).
43. The factual background is somewhat more complicated than the text suggests. The
state initially proposed to establish the black law school as part of an existing black univer-
sity. Soon afterward, the legislature created an entirely new institution, now known as Texas
Southern University but originally called Texas State University for Negroes, which was to
operate a law school. A temporary law school for blacks was authorized to begin operations
in Austin before the new university opened in its permanent quarters in Houston. See Entin,
supra note 39, at 9-10.
44. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
45. Marshall's principal experts were Dean Earl Harrison of the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School and Professor Malcolm Sharp of the University of Chicago Law School.
He also presented testimony from Robert Redfield, a lawyer and chairman of the anthropol-
ogy department at the University of Chicago, and Charles Thompson, dean of the graduate
school at Howard University.
46. The state offered its own experts to rebut this testimony. Among them were Dean
Charles McCormick and Professor A.W. Walker, Jr., of the University of Texas Law School.
For a summary of the unusual debate over educational philosophy that occurred at trial, see
Entin, supra note 39, at 33-38.
47. Professors John Frank of Yale, Alexander Frey of the University of Pennsylvania,
Robert Hale of Columbia, and Edward Levi of the University of Chicago, along with Deans
Erwin Griswold of Harvard and Harold Havighurst of Northwestern, joined Professor Emer-
son as coauthors of the brief. The substantive portions of the brief were reprinted in the
Minnesota Law Review shortly before the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Sweatt
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its high quality.48
The professors' arguments reinforced many of the points which
Marshall made on behalf of Sweatt, but the emphases contrasted
sharply. Where Marshall obliquely attacked the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessy, the law teachers assailed it frontally.
They contended that the Reconstruction Congresses which pro-
posed the fourteenth amendment and enacted numerous civil rights
statutes intended to outlaw all forms of segregation and discrimina-
tion against blacks. Thus, Plessy was wrong as a matter of law and
should be overruled.49
The professors did not rest on this point. Instead, they ad-
vanced two alternative positions, both of which assumed that Plessy
had been correctly decided. Their broader contention emphasized
that the Plessy Court had limited its approval of "separate but
equal" to contexts in which segregation was reasonable. In the field
of education, they maintained, segregation was not reasonable. The
practice caused serious harm to all students, and monitoring the
equality of racially separate institutions would be extraordinarily
difficult. Thus, segregated schooling could not be reconciled with
Plessy and, under the logic of that case, violated the Constitution.5 1
More narrowly, the law teachers urged that, even if segregation
in education were reasonable in at least some circumstances, the
two law schools in question simply were not equal. Accordingly,
the state had not complied with the Plessy doctrine. Here again,
although Marshall's brief for Sweatt made the same general argu-
ment, the professors developed the point in greater detail. Where
Marshall emphasized physical differences, the law teachers focused
primarily upon more intangible factors about which the experts had
testified at trial. 1
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of Sweatt. In
doing so, it declined to reconsider Plessy. That question would have
to wait for Brown. The Sweatt decision rested solely on the inequal-
ity of the two law schools. The Court's analysis of those differences
rested upon a most expansive definition of equality. It encompassed
case. See Segregation and the Equal Protection Clause: Brieffor thg Committee of Law Teach-
ers Against Segregation in Legal Education, 34 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1950).
48. See, e.g., K. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION § 4-5, at 131 (1984); Harper &
Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1172, 1172 (1953).
49. Brief of the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education as
Amicus Curiae at 4-22, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 291-307.
50. Id. at 34-38, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 316-20.
5I. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Compare Brief for Petitioner at 71-74
with Law Teachers Brief at 38-47, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 320-27.
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not only physical differences, but also "those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in
a law school," including the reputation of the faculty, institutional
prestige and tradition, and the influence of alumni in the profession
and the community.12
This analysis drew heavily upon arguments presented only in
the law professors' amicus brief. By defining equality in such
sweeping terms, the Court called into question the constitutionality
of segregation in legal education. When combined with the other
cases in the 1950 trilogy, Sweatt cast a long shadow over the contin-
uing vitality of segregation at any level of public education. Thus,
these decisions laid much of the groundwork for the landmark rul-
ing in Brown.
II
Professor Emerson's participation in these cases illustrates some
of the ways in which law faculty can involve themselves in public
affairs. His role in Griswold and Sweezy exemplifies the legal aca-
demic as full-fledged lawyer. His work in Sweatt represents some-
thing of a hybrid: the amicus brief is both a lawyer's argument and
a form of legal scholarship aimed at influencing the outcome of a
dispute over law and public policy.53 Because these activities repre-
sent varieties of the "committed arguments" which many law teach-
ers advance in various aspects of their work,54 Professor Emerson's
career can help us to begin to think about the public role of the law
professor.
A
The law professor as lawyer has become increasingly familiar.
During the past generation, distinguished legal scholars have ap-
peared regularly before the Supreme Court. For example, Herbert
Wechsler was lead counsel in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5
which effectively constitutionalized the law of libel, and Alexander
52. 339 U.S. at 634.
53. The many law professors who simply signed the brief without contributing to its
substance in effect subscribed to a petition or open letter. This is, of course, a common means
by which academics express themselves on matters of public concern. See infra text accom-
panying note 63.
54. This phrase has been used in a somewhat different context. See Fletcher, Two Modes
of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 984-97 (1981).
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Bickel argued New York Times Co. v. United States,56 which re-
jected the government's attempt to suppress the Pentagon Papers.
More recently, Laurence Tribe has appeared frequently in the Court
even as he remains a prolific commentator on constitutional law. 7
Perhaps the ultimate illustration of professorial advocacy, however,
is Williams v. Zbaraz,58 an abortion case in which Robert Bennett
and Victor Rosenblum, friends and colleagues on the law faculty of
Northwestern University, argued against each other.59
These and other instances involved only occasional forays into
litigation, and then only before the nation's highest judicial tribunal.
More commonly, some law professors maintain formal relationships
"of counsel" to law firms, thereby enabling them to practice law
while remaining, at least nominally, full-time academics. Others,
either by choice or due to institutional policies prohibiting "of coun-
sel" arrangements, engage in part-time practice or consult on an
individual basis.6"
On a more mundane level, legal clinics operated by law schools
and staffed by attorneys with faculty status represent clients before
courts and administrative agencies on a daily basis.6 The work of
the law school clinic differs from the previous examples in another
56. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
57. Professor Tribe has argued "around a dozen cases in the Supreme Court." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii (2d ed. 1988). Among these are Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S.
116 (1982); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Devel.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); and
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). In addition to the second edition of his
treatise, L. TRIBE, supra, and numerous law review articles, Professor Tribe has written two
other books in recent years. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985); L. TRIBE,
GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).
58. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
59. Law professors also occasionally become parties to litigation, of course. See, e.g.,
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1 (1908). That subject is outside the scope of this essay.
60. In addition, law professors can participate in the public arena as members of volun-
tary organizations. Examples include Norman Dorsen, Professor Emerson's sometime coau-
thor and a contributor to this symposium, who has headed the American Civil Liberties
Union for more than a decade, and Archibald Cox, who at one time chaired Common Cause.
61. The use of the word "mundane" does not connote a pejorative assessment of the
work of clinics. Rather, it recognizes that their primary purpose, training law students in
professional skills, ordinarily precludes clinics from accepting extremely complex or lengthy
cases. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the business of law school clinics is entirely
routine. Sometimes the questions which occupy their attention require resolution at the high-
est level. See, eg., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (involving a client
of the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the University of Chicago Law School); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247 (1978) (involving clients of the legal clinic of Northwestern University School of
Law).
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way as well. The clinic is an educational enterprise which gives
students hands-on training in the tasks of the practicing lawyer,
whereas the work of Professor Emerson and other scholars in the
cases discussed earlier was not directly connected to the law school
curriculum. Nevertheless, the law school clinic assists persons with
grievances against a party unaffiliated with the institution.6 2 Re-
gardless of the outcome, therefore, the clinic's efforts necessarily af-
fect the outside community.
B
Law professors need not embroil themselves in litigation in or-
der to participate in debates about public policy. As the amicus
brief in Sweatt illustrates, legal scholars can simply subscribe to a
position paper or petition drafted by someone else. In that instance,
nearly 200 law teachers signed the brief which Professor Emerson
and his six coauthors prepared. More recently, many others have
signed statements condemning American assistance to the Nicara-
guan rebels and various proposals to close offices of the Palestine
Liberation Organization in this country. By far the most substan-
tial instance of petition-signing by law professors was the contro-
versy over the nomination of former Judge Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court. Approximately half of the nation's full-time law
school teachers put their names to statements submitted to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee on the issue.63
Alternatively, some professors enter into the fray by means of
their scholarship. For some years, there have been repeated claims
(sometimes documented, sometimes not) that law review articles
have been secretly solicited and paid for by parties with a direct
interest in the resolution of the issues discussed.' This practice, to
62. Representing a client in a dispute with the law school or the university would in-
volve the clinic in an obvious conflict of interest. In such a situation, the clinic attorney
would have to obtain "the consent of [the] client after full disclosure" of the connection
between the institution and the clinic and of the possible impact of that connection upon the
attorney's efforts on behalf of the client. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 5-101(A) (1979). Accord MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)
(1983). Several clinical professors have told me that they do not believe that a client could
knowingly and intelligently waive that sort of conflict. This view is not unanimous, however.
One of my colleagues has recounted several instances in which law faculty at various institu-
tions have represented students in on-campus disciplinary proceedings.
63. The great majority of the professors who took a position on Judge Bork urged the
Senate to reject his nomination, a fact which his supporters noted with considerable unhappi-
ness. See, e.g., Garment, The War Against Robert H. Bork, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1988, at 17,
17-18.
64. See, e.g., Ackerman, The Marketplace ofIdeas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1136, 1147-48
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the extent that it exists, seriously compromises the intellectual in-
tegrity of the discipline.
The problem is not confined to situations in which an author has
a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a controversy to which his
writing might relate. Even in the absence of financial considera-
tions, other subjective factors might affect a law professor's analysis.
For example, one distinguished commentator has characterized
much of the modem work in constitutional law as "advocacy schol-
arship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the
[Supreme] Court to adopt our various notions of the public good."6 5
A similar conclusion presumably applies to doctrinal analysis in
other fields of law. The reason is not hard to fathom. For law
professors, as for others in the academy, prestige and access to pro-
fessional opportunities depend in part upon evidence of influence in
the discipline. In the law, in contrast to other fields, nonacademic
tribunals have the authority to resolve intellectual controversies.
This fact creates incentives for legal scholars to publish works that
courts, legislatures, agencies, and other such decisionmakers will
cite.66
(1981); Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REv. 227, 229-31 (1965);
Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 290, 300-
01(1969).
One highly publicized recent controversy involving claims of pecuniary interest concerned
a student Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The
"Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1964 (1984). Counsel for a corporation that was
the target of a hostile takeover bid cited the Note as authority supporting the legality of
management's defensive tactics. The author of the Note had been employed as a summer
associate in the law firm which devised the tactics in question, a fact which was not disclosed
to the reader. See Martin, The Law Review Citadel: Rodell Revisited, 71 IOWA L. REV.
1093, 1095 & n.12 (1986). The court ultimately upheld the defensive tactics without citing
the Note. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076-80 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
65. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Nor-
mative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981).
Modern scholars are not the only ones who may have allowed advocacy to intrude upon
the objectivity of their work. For example, Zechariah Chafee's writings concerning the origin
and meaning of the clear and present danger test seem to have been colored by his desire to
promote a more libertarian conception of the first amendment. See Rabban, The Emergence
of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 1205, 1294-303 (1983).
66. See Ackerman, supra note 64, at 1135-36; Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentia-
tion, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1131, 1136, 1147 n.68, 1151 & n.91 (1987); Kissam, The Decline of
Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 251, 265 (1986); cf Winter, Ward S. Bow-
man, Jr., 87 YALE L.J. 237, 237 (1977) (observing that "[i]mmense portions of legal literature
seem to disappear without an intellectual trace"). For criticism of the use of measures of
citation frequency as evidence of the quality of scholarly publications, see R. JACOBY, supra
note 24, at 146.
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III
The preceding discussion suggests that law professors can par-
ticipate in and seek to influence the resolution of public controver-
sies in various ways. It does not, however, address the propriety of
such participation. Indeed, that subject has generated compara-
tively little legal commentary. Yet a substantial literature on the
civic responsibility of the university and the social role of the aca-
demic expert has developed in other disciplines. That literature
raises questions about the uncritical acceptance of professorial in-
volvement in the public arena.
The commentary on this subject reflects fundamental disagree-
ment over the meaning of the scholarly vocation. Some observers
have urged that universities, including law schools, take an even
more active role in the solution of social problems than they now
do. According to this view, the campus contains unique resources
which can and should be used to promote human progress.
67
Others have argued that universities should not attempt to solve
social problems. These critics contend that institutions of higher
education exist to accumulate and transmit knowledge. Although
that knowledge might indirectly lead to improvements in the exter-
nal environment, universities simply lack the competence to reform
the outside world.68 Moreover, these commentators question
whether scholars havethe detailed intellectual understanding and
the requisite political skills to implement broad social changes.69
Thus, reform efforts probably will not succeed and, in any event,
will seriously undermine the central mission of the academic
community.
Much of this literature has arisen in the social sciences. To be
sure, many law professors do not view social science as the appro-
priate intellectual model for their field. 71 In one sense, this objec-
67. See, e.g., D. BOK, supra note 5, at 80-81; Kinoy, The Present Crisis in American
Legal Education, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5-10 (1969).
68. See, e.g., D. BOK, supra note 5, at 67-78; R. NISBET, THE DEGRADATION OF THE
ACADEMIC DOGMA 127-36, 188-93 (1971); Barzun, The Danger of "Public Service," in 1
THE UNIVERSITY CRISIS READER 123, 124-26, 128 (I. Wallerstein & P. Starr eds. 1971).
69. See, e.g., D. BOK, supra note 5, at 82; R. NISBET, supra note 68, at 182.
70. Indeed, contemporary legal scholarship is marked by extraordinary dissensus on ba-
sic questions of scope and method. Most scholars continue to work on traditional forms of
doctrinal analysis. Other approaches, however, have vocal adherents. Among these are law
and economics, see, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); critical
legal studies, see, e.g., M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); R.
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); literary theory, see, e.g.,
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Symposium, Law
and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373-586 (1982); feminist jurisprudence, see, e.g., C.
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tion appears well taken. Social scientists, after all, seek to discover
the truth. Lawyers, on the other hand, do not. Instead, the adver-
sary system requires that they zealously represent clients on the as-
sumption that similar advocacy by other lawyers on behalf of
opposing parties will lead to the discovery of the truth.
7 1
On closer examination, however, the distinction between these
disciplines tends to blur. Social science scholarship may be influ-
enced by the researcher's prior experiences and beliefs, while the
publications of university-based law professors may prove to be
more than disguised advocacy. Moreover, both law and the various
social sciences are concerned with the means by which society dis-
tributes authority, influence, and economic resources. Thus, con-
sideration of the social science literature addressing this general
subject could prove instructive.
A
For social scientists, the essential text for defining the place of
the academician in the public arena is Max Weber's classic essay,
Science as a Vocation.72 Weber, the great German political sociolo-
gist and economic historian, sharply distinguished scientific judg-
ments from political and religious commitments. For him, social
science provided a means for understanding the world more clearly.
Such understanding required an openness to new and inconvenient
facts, an openness unavailable to persons with a preconceived
worldview. 71 Weber rested his position upon the limited and tem-
porary nature of social scientific knowledge and the inevitability
that subsequent research would refute or supersede current wis-
dom.74 For him, therefore, the only authentic social science was a
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); and law and society, see, e.g., W. LOH,
SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1984); LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (L.
Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986); Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
71. See Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J.
955, 959-64 (1981). For a similar contrast involving a comparison between the natural scien-
tist as truth-seeker and the lawyer as participant in an adversary process in which the law-
yer's concern for discovering the truth plays a distinctly secondary role, see Goldberg, The
Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEo. L.J. 1341, 1348-49 (1987).
72. M. WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
129 (H. Gerth & C. Mills trans. & eds. 1946).
73. Id. at 144-56. Pasteur's oft-repeated observation that "chance favors only the pre-
pared mind," R. DuBos, LOUIS PASTEUR: FREE LANCE OF SCIENCE 101 (1960), reflects
similar views concerning the natural scientist's need for receptivity to unexpected findings.
74. M. WEBER, supra note 72, at 137-38.
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value-free social science."
The concept of a value-free social science can imply that schol-
ars should completely avoid normative discussions of public af-
fairs.7 6 Put more bluntly, the argument might run, "[t]he role of
social science lies not in the formulation of social policy, but in the
measurement of its results."'77 This approach suggests that aca-
demic lawyers should confine themselves to assessing the impact of
existing laws and regulations and evaluating the effects of changes
proposed by others. Because most law professors lack the training
to make reliable assessments, they would have no place at all in the
arena of public debate.
There are compelling reasons to reject this extreme position,
however. At the most basic level, Weber could not have meant to
propose that social scientists hermetically isolate themselves from
the world around them. Much of his analysis concerned the re-
sponsibilities of social scientists as teachers not to use the classroom
as a forum for political or religious proselytizing, especially under
the conditions prevailing in German universities in the first decades
of this century.78 Moreover, Weber personally did not divorce him-
self from the world at large. He played a prominent role in the
political and cultural life of his country.79 Thus, both the context of
his essay and the facts of his own life refute a monastic interpreta-
tion of the scholar's role.
Even those who counsel academic experts to act with appropri-
ate respect for the limits of their professional knowledge do not sup-
port the radical disjunction between the campus and the outside
world that this position implies. Instead, they urge professors who
become involved in matters of public concern to distinguish care-
fully in their statements and recommendations between what they
know (and do not know) as scholars and what they believe as
citizens.80
75. See id. at 145-46.
76. See, e.g., Millikan, Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action, in THE
HUMAN MEANING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 158, 176 (D. Lerner ed. 1959).
77. D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING 193 (1970) (emphasis
deleted).
78. See M. WEBER, supra note 72, at 129-34, 145-46, 150.
79. See Political Concerns, in Introduction to FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOL-
OGY 3, 32-44 (H. Gerth & C. Mills trans. & eds. 1946).
80. See, e.g., D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 77, at xxix-xxi, 190-201; J. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME 47-70 (1975); Millikan, supra note 76, at 166-67, 176-77, 179-80. For an
application of this distinction, see D. BEM, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 62
n.2 (1970).
Natural scientists who become involved in discussions of public policy relating to science
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At first glance, this approach appears to permit legal scholars to
express themselves on a broad range of matters external to the uni-
versity. For example, law professors should feel free to participate
in outside activities designed to clarify or systematize discrete bod-
ies of doctrine, at least as long as they do not allow their nonaca-
demic views to influence their recommendations. Illustrations
include the efforts of such bodies as the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to develop model statutes
and of the American Law Institute to codify the common law.81
Even these illustrations present unanticipated complexities, how-
ever. Some observers have complained that participants in these
activities have not always separated their personal views from their
"expert" advice.82
Another form of permissible professorial involvement under this
approach would be some form of statement advising outsiders about
a settled body of law. Illustrative subjects for such a statement in-
clude the ineligibility of a naturalized citizen for the presidency83
and the invalidity of statutes requiring racial segregation in public
schools.84 These, of course, are easy cases. More problematic ex-
amples include affirmative action and relationships between church
and state, subjects in which the Supreme Court has followed a me-
andering path and about which law professors are more likely to be
asked for advice.85 Separating specialized knowledge from personal
and technology also have been urged to distinguish between their professional expertise and
their personal attitudes. See, ag., Brooks, The Scientific Adviser, in SCIENTISTS AND NA-
TIONAL POLICY-MAKING 73, 84-85, 90-91 (R. Gilpin & C. Wright eds. 1964); Frankel, The
Continental Drift Debate, in SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES 203, 245 (H. Engelhardt, Jr. & A.
Caplan eds. 1987); Schilling, Scientists, Foreign Policy, and Politics, in SCIENTISTS AND NA-
TIONAL POLICY-MAKING 144, 169-70 (R. Gilpin & C. Wright eds. 1964).
81. See, eg., J. AMES, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HiS-
TORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 354, 367-68 (1913); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 674-76 (2d ed. 1985); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 71-
74, 83-86 (1977); R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 133, 144 nn.21 & 23.
82. See, ag., Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27
STAN. L. REV. 879, 882, 884-85 (1975).
83. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
84. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
85. The jurisprudence of affirmative action has been notably inconsistent. Compare
United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) and Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) with
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The law regarding governmental aid to religion is even more
confused. For a chronicle of the cases and an attempt at rationalization, see Marshall, "We
Know It When We See It7.:J The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495
(1986).
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views in such areas may prove impracticable.
Even if law professors could justify participation in public de-
bate under this approach, however, the foregoing illustrations do
not address the propriety of Professor Emerson's efforts in Gris-
wold, Sweezy, and Sweatt. Those efforts went considerably beyond
simple statements of existing law; they involved him in actual litiga-
tion on behalf of a party. While the adversary system is acclaimed
as a search for truth, the lawyer participates in a lawsuit as an advo-
cate, not as an impartial seeker after knowledge.86 In this context,
it does not make sense to expect a law professor to distinguish state-
ments based upon his disinterested expert knowledge from those
based upon his personal views.
In short, if one were to follow this more realistic version of the
Weberian approach, legal scholars could never represent a client.
This conclusion would work a substantial change in current prac-
tices. Universities might have reason to limit the outside work of
their law faculty, but no one has proposed an outright prohibition.87
This suggests that Weber does not provide the appropriate model
for evaluating the public role of the law professor. In fact, Weber's
analysis has proven surprisingly controversial within the social sci-
ences themselves. In those fields, an alternative approach has
emerged. This alternative might afford a more suitable framework
for discussion of our subject.
B
Weber's critics have made two distinct, but related, arguments.
Epistemologically, they claim that a truly value-free social science
cannot exist. Nonscientific factors, including the unique facts of the
scholar's personal life and the experience of living in a particular
culture at a particular time, influence the selection of topics for in-
vestigation, the choice of methods for conducting research on those
topics, and the content and format of the reported findings.88 Nor-
86. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 155-
56; Kronman, supra note 71, at 959-64.
87. Law schools, including those which permit faculty members to maintain "of coun-
sel" relationships with law firms, limit at least nominally the time commitments entailed in
such outside work. Even a harsh critic of excessive consulting by law professors does not
propose an outright ban. Instead, he suggests an elaborate profit-sharing agreement between
the professor and the school which would discourage such external distractions from the
academic enterprise. Ackerman, supra note 64, at 1144-47. A university which implements
such a proposal might suffer adverse tax consequences, however. See Jensen, Taxation, the
Student Athlete, and the Professionalization of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 35.
88. For a well-known exposition of this point, see Gouldner, Anti-Minotaur: The Myth
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matively, the critics contend that social science should not be value-
free. Their fields having originated as branches of moral philoso-
phy, these writers believe that values can and do occupy a central
place in the social sciences. Under this view, social science repre-
sents a form of disciplined advocacy.89
This alternative conception of social science remains committed
to the search for truth. Scholars who work from this perspective
attempt to understand a particular process or phenomenon. While
researchers have a point of view, they seek to advance knowledge,
not simply to persuade others.90 Moreover, engagement with the
environment beyond the university can produce important benefits
for scholarship in these fields. Precisely because the social sciences
investigate the operation of institutions and processes in the exter-
nal world, faculty participation in public affairs can generate valua-
ble first-hand insights that will inform academic research. 9
Because legal scholars also investigate the workings of important
social institutions and processes, analogous reasoning appears to
justify some outside involvement by law professors.
Certain distinctive characteristics of law schools militate against
blindly accepting this reasoning, however. Law professors occupy a
position precariously balanced between the campus and the com-
munity. Their decision to attend law school rather than graduate
school reflects at least initial ambivalence about teaching and schol-
arship. Most engaged in some form of nonacademic practice before
accepting faculty appointments. In addition, because lawyers by
tradition and training play a disproportionate role in public affairs,
law professors often have unusual opportunities to enter the outside
arena, at least in comparison with their colleagues in other fields
who may also be interested in reform.92
In short, special risks exist that law professors might overcom-
ofa Value-Free Sociology, in SOCIOLOGY ON TRIAL 35 (M. Stein & A. Vidich eds. 1963). See
also Glazer, The Ideological Uses of Sociology, in THE USES OF SOCIOLOGY 63 (P. Lazarsfeld,
W. Sewell & H. Wilensky eds. 1967). For a helpful self-analysis of how a prominent scholar's
personal experience influenced the development of a highly regarded study in political sociol-
ogy, see Lipset, The Biography of a Research Project: Union Democracy, in SOCIOLOGISTS AT
WORK 111, 111-15 (P. Hammond ed. 1967) (discussing S. LIPSET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN,
UNION DEMOCRACY (1956)).
89. See, ag., R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HAB-
ITS OF THE HEART 297-307 (1985); R. LYND, KNOWLEDGE FOR WHAT? 180-201 (1939);
ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICS (H. Storing ed. 1962); Values in Action: A
Symposium, HUM. ORG., Spring, 1958, at 2-26.
90. See Kronman, supra note 71, at 967-68.
91. See, ag., D. BOK, supra note 5, at 74.
92. See Underwood, Against Dichotomy, 90 YALE L.J. 1004, 1006 (1981).
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mit themselves to outside endeavors. That prospect threatens to
harm legal education in two ways. First, excessive external involve-
ment could delegitimize the law as an academic discipline. For ex-
ample, publication requirements for law professors generally are
strikingly modest compared to the standards applicable to faculty in
most other disciplines.9 3 Extensive outside activities divert time
and energy from research, thereby reducing the quantity (and per-
haps also the quality) of legal scholarship. This could reinforce the
opinions of intellectual traditionalists who maintain that law
schools do not belong in universities. Law schools in this view are
trade schools whose primary loyalty is to the bar; their existence on
campus undermines the cohesion of the academic community and
detracts from the central purposes of higher education.94
Second, large-scale professorial involvement in public affairs
could subvert the autonomy of law schools. Encroachments could
arise at the behest of outsiders who view the off-campus activities of
law faculty as threatening to their interests or as insufficiently aca-
demic in nature. A broad array of evidence suggests the plausibility
of this concern. In the sciences, for instance, government support
for research traditionally was allocated through an elaborate peer
review mechanism designed to insulate funding decisions from the
political process. Recently, however, as higher education came to
be viewed as just another interest group, Congress has appropriated
increasingly larger sums directly to specific universities.95
Similarly, the Community Action Program, originally billed as
the centerpiece of the War on Poverty two decades ago, ended igno-
miniously when local political leaders who viewed the effort as a
threat to their positions helped to destroy it.96 Perhaps closer to
home for present purposes, Legal Service Corporation lawyers,
whose initial successes prompted strong criticism from officials
whose policies those lawyers challenged, face significant restrictions
on the types of cases they can litigate and the kinds of activities they
may perform on behalf of their clients.97
93. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 64, at 1133, 1135-36, 1141-44.
94. See D. BOK, supra note 5, at 71-73; R. WOLFF, THE IDEAL OF THE UNIVERSITY 12-
13, 152-53 (1969).
95. See, e.g., Norman, Pork Barrel Science: No End in Sight, 236 ScL. 16 (1987);
Goldberg, supra note 71, at 1353; Cordes, Biggest Pork Barrel Ever: $225-Milion for Projects
that Bypassed Merit Reviews, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 27, 1988, at Al.
96. For an account of the rise and fall of community action, see D. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 77, at 128-66.
97. Federal law prohibits legal services lawyers from engaging in electoral politics and
severely restricts their lobbying. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(c)(2), (e)(1) (1982). Other provisions
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The concern for law school autonomy from external constraints
is not entirely far-fetched. The academy and the bar traditionally
have coexisted uneasily.98 Law schools are accredited by both the
American Bar Association and the Association of American Law
Schools. Although these organizations generally have worked co-
operatively, long-standing tensions between them occasionally sur-
face.99 During the past fifteen years judges and bar officials
repeatedly have expressed concern over the professional compe-
tence of recent law graduates, expressions which at times have been
accompanied by proposals for imposing extensive new curricular re-
quirements upon law schools."°0 Moreover, law schools rely upon
the good will of the bar for placing their students, and many schools
obtain financial support from law firms to underwrite various as-
pects of their educational programs.101 These factors underscore
the fragile independence of legal education. They also suggest that,
if the outside activities of law faculty became so extensive as to ob-
scure the differences between law schools and the practicing bar, the
practitioners can be expected to attempt to limit the off-campus en-
deavors of the professoriate.
These considerations will not end the outside activities of legal
scholars. As noted earlier, no constituency exists for a monastic
view of law schools; and significant intellectual benefits can flow
from these activities. At the same time, this analysis simply justifies
public involvement; it says nothing about the form and extent of
that involvement. Those subjects present a host of complex
problems. Space does not permit a complete discussion, but some
of those problems deserve brief attention.
Consider first the question of "advocacy scholarship." Some au-
thors may have pecuniary or other personal interests in the resolu-
tion of particular legal controversies. At a minimum, professors
should disclose the fact and source, if not the amount, of payments
limit the use of class actions and prevent legal service agencies from litigating certain kinds of
abortion and school desegregation cases. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e(c)(t), 2996f(b)(8)-(9) (1982).
98. See F. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 51-56, 60-62, 64-67, 82-83
(1979).
99. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 98, 109 n.65, 119-20.
100. See F. ALLEN, supra note 98, at 51-52, 83; R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 238-40, 255-
57 nn.80-83 & 86-89. Although the most draconian proposals have not been adopted, exter-
nal pressures have had some impact on law school curricula. For example, the mandatory
course on Professional Responsibility was instituted at the insistence of the ABA, which
made such instruction a condition of accreditation in response to public concern over the
ethical lapses of the many lawyers implicated in the Watergate scandal. See Kissam, supra
note 66, at 283-84.
101. See Kissam, supra note 66, at 288-89.
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they have received in connection with their written work.'1 2 This
small step surely represents progress, but it is a partial solution at
best. For example, a dispassionate observer might find it difficult to
accept the proposition that the judgments of a scholar who repeat-
edly obtains funding from interested parties can be entirely in-
dependent of the interests of those parties.
Even if an academic has no pecuniary interest in the resolution
of a public issue to which his scholarship relates, exponents of the
social-science-as-moral-philosophy approach maintain that he al-
most certainly will have personal views on the subject. The tradi-
tional prescription in this situation is for the scholar clearly and
carefully to state those views.103 No doubt such a procedure will
prove helpful, but its utility can be exaggerated. In many instances,
individuals may not find it possible to articulate the influence of
their moral, philosophical, or political views. 1" Thus, disclosure
can serve at best as only a partial antidote for advocacy scholarship.
Participation in litigation, whether as counsel of record (as Pro-
fessor Emerson was in Griswold and Sweezy) or as amicus (as he was
in Sweatt), presents at least two possibly sensitive issues. First, pre-
cisely because legal scholars do not typically appear in court on be-
half of a party to a lawsuit, a professor's very presence could exert a
subtle influence on the proceedings. The precise impact in any
given case is difficult to predict, but the decisionmaker (whether
judge or jury) could view such a case as unusual in some respect.
For instance, because law professors ordinarily would not waste
their time on inconsequential matters, some persons might believe
that any client who has a professor for a lawyer has an unusually
good case. Alternatively, other persons might wonder whether such
a client could not get a "regular" lawyer because his case was espe-
cially bleak. Whether and to what extent either of these phenomena
occurs is unclear, but the recent concern over attorney competence
suggests that we should view the possibility as worthy of further
consideration.
Second, some members of the public or of the government may
102. See Douglas, supra note 64, at 232-33; Miller, supra note 64, at 301. For a sugges-
tion that law reviews refuse to publish commissioned works of advocacy scholarship, see
Ackerman, supra note 64, at 1147.
103. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 64, at 302-03. For an example of such disclosure in a
work of legal scholarship, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v (1st ed. 1978),
reprinted in id. at ix (2d ed. 1988).
104. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Note, United States v. Progres-
sive, Inc.: The Faustian Bargain and the First Amendment, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 538, 555-56
(1980).
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seek to retaliate in some fashion against the law school or university
if a law professor becomes involved in unpopular or path-breaking
litigation. Such retaliation could cause real harm to an institution,
particularly if a state legislature or substantial donor withdrew or
reduced important financial commitments. With respect to scholar-
ship, the tradition of academic freedom holds that universities are
not responsible for the personal views of faculty members and de-
mands that the law school resist external threats of this kind. 105
While academic freedom may not extend completely to profes-
sorial involvement in litigation and the Constitution may not fully
protect academic freedom, 10 6 an analogy from first amendment law
suggests that university regulation of law faculty involvement in
sensitive lawsuits should not be excessively risk-averse. Until
shortly after World War I, the federal judiciary almost without ex-
ception allowed the government to punish speech which advocated
or tended to promote unlawful conduct.1"7 The Supreme Court
then haltingly developed the clear and present danger test,10 8 which
eventually afforded very strong protection to that type of speech.109
Although the analogy may be imperfect, it suggests that law profes-
sors should not have to justify their involvement in litigation unless
the possible reaction includes something substantially more serious
than the mere possibility of adverse consequences.1 10 At the same
time, the potentially deleterious impact upon the law school or the
university might well be an appropriate factor for a law professor to
consider before deciding to participate in any particular case."'
105. See, ag., D. BOK, supra note 5, at 26-27, 299-300.
106. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
107. See, eg., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Shaffer v. United States,
255 F. 886 (9th Cir. 1919). But see Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rey'd,
246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
108. See, eg., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919).
109. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
110. Another analogy from first amendment jurisprudence might be more apt. The
Supreme Court has struggled to define the circumstances in which the rights of a speaker
must give way in the face of a hostile audience. Although many of these issues remain unset-
tled, the Court appears to have moved toward according greater protection to the speaker in
order to avoid the problem of the heckler's veto. Compare Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1950) with Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) and Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
11I. Even if no retaliation against the law school or the university actually does occur,
the law professor's client might believe that the possibility of such retaliation influenced the
professor's handling of the litigation, particularly if the case ends in less than complete vic-
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IV
The contemporary law school occupies an unusually ambiguous
position. An important segment of a larger university devoted to
the production and dissemination of knowledge, it also serves as a
training ground for a very practical profession. Law professors
therefore have divided loyalties: to an academic community which
often regards them with suspicion for their connection to the real
world, and to a bar which may perceive their interest in intellectual
currents in the arts and sciences as indifference to the concerns of
the practicing lawyer.
Educated as advocates and, for the most part, lacking the formal
qualifications to contribute to the work of other disciplines, legal
scholars generally concern themselves with doctrinal issues. While
controversies in other fields are resolved by academicians, the
power to determine disputes of concern to law professors rests with
external decisionmakers such as courts and legislatures. This fea-
ture of the law creates incentives for legal scholars to seek to per-
suade the external decisionmakers, especially by participating as
lawyers in an occasional case or other proceeding.
Thomas Emerson's efforts in Griswold, Sweezy, and Sweatt serve
as a lasting reminder that distinguished professors can also be very
good lawyers. Those courtroom efforts affected the course of the
law and undoubtedly enriched his scholarship and teaching. Yet
the very success of such practical work underscores the intractable
conflict between the campus and the larger community which all
members of law faculties and all law schools must address.
tory for the client. This additional consideration might also influence the professor's decision
to become involved in a particular lawsuit.
[Vol. 38:512
